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Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544
Previous research has shown that two components of the event-related brain potential, the P300 and feedback negativity, are sensitive to
information about rewards and penalties. The present study investigated the properties of these components in a simple gambling game
that required participants to choose between cards that were unpredictably associated with monetary gains and losses of variable
magnitude. The aim was to determine the sensitivity of each component to two critical features of reward stimuli: magnitude (small or
large) and valence (win or loss). A double dissociation was observed, with the P300 sensitive to reward magnitude but insensitive to
reward valence and the feedback negativity showing the opposite pattern, suggesting that these two fundamental features of rewarding
stimuli are evaluated rapidly and separately in the human brain. Subsequent analyses provided additional evidence of functional disso-
ciations between the feedback negativity and P300. First, the P300 (but not the feedback negativity) showed sensitivity to the reward value
of alternative, nonselected stimuli. Second, individual differences in the amplitude of the feedback negativity correlated with individual
differences in risk-taking behavior observed after monetary losses, whereas individual differences in P300 amplitude were related to
behavioral adjustments observed in response to alternative, unchosen outcomes.
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Introduction
A central function of the cognitive system is to determine the
affective or motivational significance of ongoing events, and it
seems likely that mechanisms have evolved to provide rapid eval-
uations of the reward value of stimuli we encounter in our envi-
ronment. Studies using electroencephalographic (EEG) record-
ings from human participants have identified event-related brain
potential (ERP) correlates of this rapid evaluative function (Sut-
ton et al., 1978; Johnston, 1979; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
Holroyd and Coles, 2002). These experiments have typically in-
volved participants performing simple gambling games in which
they win or lose money on the basis of unpredictable outcomes.
Early studies reported that feedback stimuli indicating the
outcomes of monetary gambles elicit a slow-wave component,
labeled the P300 for its positive polarity and latency, that in-
creases in amplitude with the amount of money won or lost (Sut-
ton et al., 1978; Johnston, 1979). More recently, it has been shown
that feedback stimuli also elicit a negative ERP component occur-
ring 200 –300 msec after feedback delivery. This feedback nega-
tivity is larger in amplitude after negative outcomes, such as in-
correct responses or losses of money, than after positive
outcomes (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
Holroyd and Coles, 2002), leading to the proposal that this com-
ponent reflects the evaluation of events along a good– bad
dimension.
Previous research has thus identified two ERP correlates of
reward processing, but fundamental questions remain concern-
ing the underlying cognitive and neural processes. First, it re-
mains to be determined whether P300 amplitude varies with re-
ward value simply because participants pay more attention to
outcomes of larger monetary gambles, or whether P300 ampli-
tude indexes meaningful changes in cognitive processing of re-
ward information. Second, the nature of the evaluative process
reflected in the feedback negativity remains unknown. One pos-
sibility is that the evaluation provides a scalar estimate of utility or
value, in which case the feedback negativity should increase in
amplitude with increases in monetary penalty. Alternatively, the
evaluation might discretely classify events as being “good” or
“bad” essentially independently of the magnitude of reward ob-
tained or penalty incurred, in which case the feedback negativity
should be insensitive to reward magnitude.
To address these issues, in the present research we recorded
ERPs from human participants as they performed a simple mon-
etary gambling game. The participants were required to select
between two colored cards that were unpredictably associated
with small and large monetary gains and losses. After their selec-
tion, participants were given feedback indicating the outcome of
their choice and were then told what they would have won had
they made the alternative choice. Using this design, we directly
investigated how the valence and magnitude of experienced re-
wards affected the P300 and feedback negativity. In addition, the
design allowed us to investigate whether these ERP components
are sensitive only to immediate, experienced rewards, or whether
they are also sensitive to the reward value of alternative, nonse-
Received Aug. 18, 2003; revised May 3, 2004; accepted May 20, 2004.
This research was supported by National Institutes of Health Grant P50-MH62196 and by a grant from the Seaver
Institute (A.G.S.). We thank Jonathan Cohen, Clay Holroyd, and Sander Nieuwenhuis for helpful discussions and
comments on previous drafts of this manuscript.
Correspondence should be addressed to Nick Yeung, Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ 08544. E-mail: nyeung@princeton.edu.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4537-03.2004
Copyright © 2004 Society for Neuroscience 0270-6474/04/246258-07$15.00/0
6258 • The Journal of Neuroscience, July 14, 2004 • 24(28):6258 – 6264
lected choices. Finally, this design enabled us to investigate the
relationship between ERP signatures of reward processing and
participants’ behavioral choices.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Sixteen right-handed participants (eight females and eight
males, 18 –22 years of age), all undergraduates at Princeton University,
received course credit and a small monetary bonus for their participa-
tion. The monetary bonus depended on the outcomes of the gambling
game, as described below. All participants gave written informed con-
sent, and the study was approved by the local research ethics committee.
Procedure. The participants were seated comfortably1 m in front of
a computer screen in an electromagnetically shielded room. On each trial
of the experiment (see Fig. 1 for an example), they were presented with
two colored rectangles displayed on either side of a fixation point and
were asked to imagine that these rectangles were cards dealt from a ran-
domly shuffled deck containing cards of four colors. This pair of cards
remained on the screen until the participant selected one of them by
pressing a button with either their left or right index finger, correspond-
ing to the location of the chosen card. After their response, the chosen
card was highlighted with a thick white border for 500 msec, after which
time a number (either positive or negative) appeared on the card for 1000
msec to indicate how much money they won or lost on the trial; this was
the chosen outcome. After an additional interval of 500 msec, the partic-
ipants were shown what they would have won or lost had they selected
the other card. We called this the alternative outcome. Again, this infor-
mation remained on the screen for 1000 msec and was followed by an
intertrial interval of 500 msec.
Four colors of cards were used: red, green, blue, and purple. Two of the
colors were always associated with large outcomes, which were wins or
losses of 32– 40¢ (these colors were referred to as large decks), and two
were always associated with small outcomes, which were wins or losses of
6 –11¢ (these colors were referred to as small decks). The assignment of
colors to reward magnitudes was varied across participants. The colors
presented on any given trial were randomized with the constraint that
each possible pairing occurred with equal frequency. Pairings of identical
colored cards were allowed. Thus, on half of all trials, participants chose
between one large card and one small card. The other half of trials in-
volved selecting between two small cards or between two large cards.
The outcome of each trial was determined pseudorandomly with the
constraint that each participant experienced equal numbers of small wins
and small losses and equal numbers of large wins and large losses. The
ratio of small to large outcomes depended on the participants’ choices
and hence was not controlled. Although colors were consistently associ-
ated with either small or large outcomes for each participant, there re-
mained some degree of uncertainty about the outcome of each trial,
because small outcomes varied between 6 and
11¢ and large outcomes varied between 32 and
40¢. Within these ranges, the frequency of pos-
sible outcomes was weighted such that the
mean expected value of each trial was 1¢ for
both small and large choices. The participants
were not told about these experimental contin-
gencies and were simply instructed to “use any
strategy you want to help you maximize your
points total.” They were informed about their
current cumulative winnings at the end of each
block. There were 480 trials total, divided into
15 equal blocks. Thus, participants won $4.80
on average. They were (truthfully) told that
they would keep whatever money they won
playing the game, in addition to their course
credits.
EEG methods and analysis. We recorded the
EEG using Ag–AgCl electrodes embedded in a
fabric cap (Neurosoft, El Paso, TX), arranged
according to the 10 –20 system, from channels
FP1, FP2, AFz, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCz,
FC4, FT8, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, TP7, CP3, CPz,
CP4, TP8, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, Oz, and O2. Other electrodes were
placed on the right mastoid, above and below the right eye, and on the
outer canthi of both eyes. The electrode common was placed on the chin.
All electrode recordings were referenced to an electrode placed on the left
mastoid, and electrode impedances were kept below 50 k. EEG data
were amplified by a gain of 20,000 with a 12 bit processor using Senso-
rium (Charlotte, VT) EPA-6 128 Channel Electro-Physiology Amplifiers
(1 G input impedance). The sampling rate was 250 Hz.
Separate EEG epochs of 800 msec (200 msec baseline) were extracted
off-line for chosen and alternative outcome stimuli on each trial. These
EEG epochs were rereferenced to linked-mastoid electrodes and baseline
corrected by subtracting half of the activity recorded at the right mastoid
and the average activity of that channel during the baseline period sepa-
rately for each EEG epoch recorded at each channel. Ocular artifacts were
corrected with an eye-movement correction algorithm (Gratton et al.,
1983).
We measured P300 amplitude on individual trials as the most positive
peak in the waveform at electrode location Pz in the period 200 – 600
msec after feedback onset, after 2 Hz low-pass filtering. We quantified the
feedback negativity in the averaged ERP waveforms for each participant
as the base-to-peak difference in voltage between the most negative peak
200 – 400 msec after stimulus onset and the average voltage of the imme-
diately preceding and following positive peaks. We chose to include both
the preceding and following positive peaks in our base-to-peak measure
of the feedback negativity to avoid overestimating its amplitude in con-
ditions in which this component peaked after the P300. Nevertheless, we
found qualitatively similar results in an analysis in which we measured
the feedback negativity as the voltage difference between the negative
peak and the preceding positive peak alone, as used in many previous
studies of the feedback negativity.
For the purposes of statistical analysis of scalp topographies, compo-
nent amplitudes were calculated across 15 electrode locations that were
chosen to cover scalp areas known from previous studies to be the focus
of the feedback negativity and P300. Initially, the feedback negativity and
P300 data were each subjected to ANOVAs with four within-subjects
factors: reward magnitude (small and large), reward valence (win and
loss), anteroposterior scalp location (frontal, frontocentral, central, cen-
troparietal, parietal), and lateral scalp location (3 left; zmidline; 4
right). Subsequently, more detailed analyses focused on the electrode
locations at which the components were maximal. In all analyses, degrees
of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse–Geisser  values.
Results
Behavioral results
There are few meaningful behavioral measures in the task, be-
cause rewards and penalties were assigned pseudorandomly. The
Figure 1. The sequence of events during a single trial of the gambling game. Participants were presented on each trial with a
choice of two colored cards, one of which they selected with a left- or right-hand keypress. After 500 msec, they were shown the
outcome associated with the selected card for 1000 msec. After an additional 500 msec, they were shown the alternative outcome
(i.e., what they would have won had they made the alternative choice). RT, Response time.
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task was simply intended as a realistic context in which the par-
ticipants could experience rewards and penalties. Nevertheless,
there was a good deal of variability across participants in their
preferences for small or large decks. The proportion of large
decks selected by participants varied between 0.38 and 0.66
(mean  0.52; SD  0.07). These differences reflected stable
response strategies. We found a significant correlation between
the proportion of small and large choices made by each partici-
pant in the first half and second half of the experiment (r(15) 
0.5; p 0.05). Moreover, the greater the proportion of small (or
large) choices made by a participant, the faster they were to select
a small (or large) card (r(15) 0.69; p 0.01).
Importantly, participants’ choices indicated that they were
sensitive to the outcomes of their gambles. Participants were
more likely to select a large card if they had lost money on the
previous trial than if they had won money (F(1,15) 7.1; p 0.05)
(cf. Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). This was the case regardless
of whether the loss on the previous trial was large or small (F 1).
Participants were also sensitive to the nature of the alternative
outcome (what they would have won had they made a different
choice). They were more likely to choose decks that on the pre-
vious trial had been associated with positive alternative outcomes
(F(1,15)  11.9; p  0.01). In particular, participants were more
likely to choose a large card if the alternative outcome on the
previous trial was a large win than if this alternative was a large
loss (t(15) 17.1; p 0.01). They were also slightly more likely to
choose a small card when the alternative outcome on the previous
trial was a small win than if this alternative was a small loss, but
this effect was not reliable (t 1).
ERP results
Chosen outcomes
Grand-average ERP waveforms for the four possible outcomes
are shown in Figure 2. The data are shown for electrode location
FCz at which the feedback negativity was maximal, as described
below. Although P300 amplitude was maximal over more poste-
rior locations, again as described below, a substantial P300 is
nonetheless evident at FCz. Thus, consistent with previous re-
search, ERP waveforms elicited by feedback stimuli were charac-
terized by a large P300, on which was superimposed a feedback
negativity peaking300 msec after feedback presentation. Figure
3 shows scalp voltage maps of difference waves for orthogonal
contrasts between reward valence and magnitude at this time.
P300. An ANOVA of P300 amplitude revealed reliable main
effects of anteroposterior location (F(4,60)  15.7;   0.34; p 
0.01) and laterality (F(2,30)  9.3;   0.82; p  0.01) and a
marginally reliable interaction between these factors (F(8,120) 
2.3;   0.61; p  0.05), indicating that P300 amplitude was
greatest at posterior midline sites (CPz and Pz) and reduced at
more frontal and lateral electrode locations. There was a reliable
main effect of reward magnitude (F(1,15) 28.6; p 0.01), indi-
cating that P300 amplitude was greater for large outcomes than
for small outcomes. As shown in Figure 3 (top), the effect of
reward magnitude was greatest at the posterior midline sites
at which the P300 was maximal, reflected in reliable interactions
between reward magnitude and anteroposterior location
(F(4,60)  16.1;   0.37; p  0.01) and reward magnitude and
laterality (F(2,30)  7.6;   0.86; p  0.01). In contrast to these
strong effects of reward magnitude, there was no reliable main
effect or interactions involving the factor of reward valence on
P300 amplitude ( p values 0.1).
Subsequent pairwise comparisons indicated that the effects of
reward magnitude on P300 amplitude were reliably greater at
posterior scalp locations CPz and Pz than at frontal sites Fz and
FCz ( p values 0.01). At electrode location Pz, P300 amplitude
varied across conditions as follows: large loss, 18.4V; large win,
18.9 V; small loss, 13.9 V; small win, 13.7 V. An ANOVA on
the data from location Pz confirmed that P300 amplitude was
reliably greater on trials with large outcomes than on trials with
small outcomes (F(1,15)  29.5; p  0.01) but was unaffected by
the valence of the outcome stimulus (F  1) being equally large
for losses and wins. The difference in P300 amplitude between
large and small outcomes does not reflect a difference in the
frequencies with which these outcomes were encountered. As
Figure 2. Grand-average ERP waveforms from channel FCz as a function of reward magni-
tude and valence of chosen outcomes. The abscissa shows the time (in milliseconds) relative to
the presentation of the outcome stimulus.
Figure 3. Scalp topography of orthogonal contrasts between reward magnitude and va-
lence of chosen outcomes 300 msec after presentation of the outcome stimulus. Top, Topogra-
phy of voltage differences between large and small outcomes separately for trials involving
wins and losses. Bottom, Topography of voltage differences between losses and wins separately
for trials with large and small outcomes.
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noted above, small and large outcomes were encountered with
approximately equal frequency. Moreover, when we performed a
median split analysis to compare participants who chose mainly
large decks with participants who chose mainly small decks, P300
amplitude differences between large and small outcomes were, if
anything, slightly larger in the former group (5.7 V) than in the
latter (4.1 V; t 1). P300 amplitude is typically high for unex-
pected or infrequent stimuli and low for expected or frequent
stimuli (Sutton et al., 1967). Thus, the observed P300 amplitude
difference between large and small outcomes cannot be explained
in terms of the frequency with which outcomes were encountered
and instead appears to relate specifically to the reward value of the
feedback stimuli.
Feedback negativity. We quantified the feedback negativity as
the base-to-peak difference in voltage between the most negative
peak 200 – 400 msec after stimulus onset and the immediately
preceding and following positive peaks. An ANOVA of these data
revealed a reliable main effect of reward
valence (F(1,15) 4.8; p 0.05), indicating
that the feedback negativity was greater af-
ter losses than after gains. As shown at the
bottom of Figure 3, this difference between
loss and gain trials, the feedback negativ-
ity, was greatest at midline frontocentral
locations, reflected in a reliable interaction
between reward valence and anteroposte-
rior location (F(4,60)  8.1;   0.42; p 
0.01) and marginally reliable interactions
between valence and laterality (F(2,30) 
3.0;   0.98; p  0.06) and between va-
lence, anteroposterior location, and later-
ality (F(8,120) 2.3;  0.54; p 0.06). In
contrast to these effects of reward valence,
there was no significant effect of reward
magnitude on the amplitude of the feed-
back negativity (F 1).
Pairwise comparisons indicated that the effects of reward va-
lence on the amplitude of the feedback negativity were reliably
greater at frontal scalp locations Fz and FCz than at posterior sites
Pz and CPz ( p values  0.01). Subsequent analyses focused on
electrode location FCz, at which the feedback negativity was max-
imal. At FCz, the amplitude of this component was larger after
losses (6.4 V) than after gains (3.5 V; F(1,15)  14.0; p 
0.01). Critically, the feedback negativity was no larger after a large
loss (6.0 V) than after a small loss (6.7 V; F  1). To
confirm that this finding was not an artifact of the base-to-peak
algorithm used, we also quantified the feedback negativity as the
most negative peak in the difference wave between losses and
gains and as the average voltage in a 48 msec window centered
around the component peak. Neither analysis revealed a reliable
difference between the feedback negativity elicited by large and
small losses (F1.25; p values 0.25).
Summary. The P300 and feedback negativity were clearly evi-
dent in the ERP waveforms. The P300 had a posterior midline
focus, whereas the feedback negativity was maximal over medial
frontal sites. Critically, we found a functional dissociation be-
tween these two reward-sensitive components, with the P300 se-
lectively sensitive to reward magnitude, regardless of reward va-
lence, and the feedback negativity showing the opposite pattern.
Alternative outcomes
Additional functional dissociations between the P300 and feed-
back negativity are suggested by an analysis of the ERP waveforms
elicited by stimuli indicating the value of the unchosen card.
Figure 4 presents grand-average ERP waveforms at FCz after al-
ternative outcomes as a function of the absolute reward value
associated with those stimuli (Fig. 4a) and as a function of their
value relative to the chosen outcome (Fig. 4b). Figure 5 shows
scalp voltage maps of difference waves for orthogonal contrasts
between reward valence and magnitude at 300 msec after presen-
tation of the alternative outcome.
P300. As was the case for chosen outcomes, P300 amplitude
was greatest at midline posterior scalp locations, reflected in re-
liable main effects of anteroposterior location (F(4,60) 16.4; 
0.29; p 0.01) and laterality (F(2,30) 9.1;  0.97; p 0.01) and
a reliable interaction between these two factors (F(4,60) 3.1; 
0.51; p 0.05). Critically, P300 amplitude was greater when the
alternative outcome was large than when the alternative was
small (F(1,15) 27.0; p 0.01). This difference between large and
small alternative outcomes showed a centroparietal focus (Fig. 5,
top), indicated by reliable interactions between reward magni-
Figure 4. Grand-average ERP waveforms from channel FCz after the presentation of alternative outcomes. Results are shown
separately as a function of the objective reward magnitude and valence of these outcomes ( a) and the value of these outcomes
relative to the chosen outcome on the trial ( b). The abscissa shows the time (in milliseconds) relative to the presentation of the
outcome stimulus.
Figure 5. Scalp topography of orthogonal contrasts between reward magnitude and va-
lence of alternative outcomes 300 msec after stimulus presentation. Top, Topography of voltage
differences between large and small outcomes. Bottom, Topography of voltage differences
between trials in which the alternative outcome was associated with gains and losses of money;
trials with large and small outcomes are indicated separately.
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tude and anteroposterior location (F(4,60)  4.8;   0.28; p 
0.05) and reward magnitude and laterality (F(2,30)  18.8;  
0.83; p  0.01). At electrode location Pz, P300 amplitude was
much greater after large (20.2 V) than small (14.2 V) alterna-
tive outcomes (F(1,15)  22.3; p  0.01) (comparable effects on
P300 amplitude can be seen in Fig. 4a for electrode FCz). To-
gether, these findings suggest that P300 amplitude is sensitive to
the magnitude of signaled reward value, regardless of whether the
reward was actually obtained.
Surprisingly, P300 amplitude also showed some sensitivity
to the valence of alternative outcomes, being reliably larger
when the alternative outcome was a gain than when it was a loss
(F(1,15)  5.3; p  0.05). This effect of valence was particularly
marked for large outcomes, reflected in a reliable three-way in-
teraction between reward valence, magnitude, and anteroposte-
rior location (F(4,60) 5.7;  0.43; p 0.05). A separate analysis
indicated that P300 amplitude was also larger when the alterna-
tive outcome was better than the chosen outcome than when the
alternative outcome was the worse of the two (F(1,15) 5.0; p
0.05). As shown at the bottom right of Figure 5, the effects of
reward valence were largest over posterior scalp locations (al-
though corresponding effects can also be observed in Fig. 4 for
electrode location FCz). Figure 5 also suggests that the effects of
reward valence on P300 amplitude showed some evidence of
right lateralization. However, there were no reliable interactions
involving reward valence and laterality ( p values 0.25). Thus, it
remains an open question whether these effects of reward valence
reflect processing in brain regions separate from those responsi-
ble for coding reward magnitude, as reflected in the midline cen-
troparietal P300 effects described above.
Feedback negativity. The feedback negativity was insensitive to
the reward value of alternative outcomes. When quantified across
all 15 scalp locations using the base-to-peak measure described
above, the amplitude of the feedback negativity showed no main
effects of reward valence or magnitude (F values  1) and no
reliable interaction between these two factors (F(1,15) 1.3; p
0.25). Likewise, at electrode FCz, at which the feedback negativity
to chosen outcomes was maximal, there was no effect of whether
the alternative outcome was a loss (4.4 V) or gain (4.3 V)
of money (F 1) and no effect of reward magnitude (F 1) (Fig.
4a). Nor did the feedback negativity show evidence of sensitivity
to the value of alternative outcomes in relation to chosen out-
comes (Fig. 4b). The feedback negativity was as large when the
alternative outcome was worse than the chosen outcome (4.0
V) as when the alternative outcome was better than the chosen
outcome (3.9 V; F  1). Thus, the feedback negativity was
insensitive to whether the participants had made the correct or
incorrect choice on the trial.
Summary. The P300, but not the feedback negativity, showed
sensitivity to information about the reward value of alternative
outcomes. As was the case for chosen outcomes, P300 amplitude
was greater for large than small alternative outcomes. P300 am-
plitude also showed an unexpected sensitivity to the valence of
alternative outcomes, being greatest on trials in which partici-
pants had failed to select a card associated with a large win. In
contrast, the feedback negativity was unaffected by whether the
alternative outcome was a win or loss, large or small, or better or
worse than the chosen outcome.
ERPs and behavioral adjustments
The findings described above demonstrate that the feedback neg-
ativity is observed when participants’ choices result in a loss of
money and that participants are more likely to choose large (or
risky) gambles after such losses. The results also demonstrate an
increased positivity over right posterior regions when partici-
pants’ choices led them to miss out on a large win (the alternative
outcome on the trial). After such trials, participants were more
likely to select large decks. Thus, chosen and alternative outcomes
were associated with specific ERP signatures and particular be-
havioral adjustments.
To assess whether these behavioral and ERP phenomena are
related, we performed two additional analyses. In the first analy-
sis, we divided the participants into two groups on the basis of the
size of their behavioral adjustment after losses of money on the
chosen outcome. We then compared the amplitude of the feed-
back negativity elicited by such losses across the two groups. This
analysis revealed that participants whose behavior showed a
greater shift to risk-taking behavior after losses of money had a
greater feedback negativity (8.9 V) than participants who
showed little behavioral adjustment after losses (3.9V; t(14)
2.7; p 0.05). In the second analysis, we divided the participants
into two groups on the basis of the size of their behavioral adjust-
ment after trials in which they failed to select a card associated
with a large win. We then compared these two groups according
to the difference in P300 amplitude elicited by large-gain and
large-loss alternative outcomes. This P300 effect was larger in the
participants showing a greater behavioral adjustment (3.9 V)
than in participants showing small behavioral adjustments (0.6
V), although the difference was only marginally reliable (t(14)
1.8; p  0.09). Together, these results suggest that individual
differences in the feedback negativity and P300 reflect meaning-
ful differences in the processing of reward information.
Discussion
Consistent with previous research, we found sensitivity to infor-
mation about rewards and penalties in two ERP components, the
P300 and feedback negativity. Extending these findings, we found
a double dissociation between the two components in relation to
chosen outcomes, with the P300 sensitive to reward magnitude
but unaffected by reward valence and the feedback negativity
showing the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that reward
magnitude and valence are processed separately in the brain.
Moreover, this separation appears to occur very early in process-
ing; effects of reward magnitude and valence were apparent on
the P300 and feedback negativity within 300 msec of feedback
onset.
Analyses of ERP waveforms elicited by unchosen, alternative
outcomes suggested additional functional dissociations between
the two components. Although these alternative outcomes were
not directly associated with rewards and penalties, they were nev-
ertheless behaviorally relevant. This behavioral relevance was re-
flected in the finding that participants adjusted their choices
based on alternative outcomes, being more likely to select large
(risky) decks if on the previous trial they had failed to select a card
associated with a large reward. It is therefore of interest that the
P300, but not the feedback negativity, was affected by the value of
alternative outcomes. P300 amplitude increased with the magni-
tude of alternative outcomes, whereas the feedback negativity was
insensitive both to the valence of alternative outcomes and to
whether these alternative outcomes were better or worse than
chosen outcomes.
The observed influence of reward magnitude on P300 ampli-
tude is not attributable to differences in the relative frequencies of
large and small outcomes. If anything, participants chose large
outcomes more often than small ones. Nor does the effect appear
to reflect a general increase in EEG amplitude because more at-
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tention is paid to gambles with large outcomes. If this were so,
one would expect the amplitude of the feedback negativity to also
increase with the magnitude of the penalty incurred, but this was
not observed. Indeed, we observed a null effect of reward magni-
tude on the feedback negativity, although voltage differences in
P300 amplitude as a function of magnitude appeared before its
onset. Thus, the impact of reward magnitude on the P300 appears
to reflect a meaningful change in neural processing. In this re-
gard, the finding that P300 amplitude was affected by the reward
magnitude of both chosen and alternative outcomes might be
interpreted as evidence that this component reflects an objective
coding of reward magnitude, regardless of whether the reward is
actually obtained. However, given that alternative outcomes were
behaviorally relevant to the task, it could also be that P300 am-
plitude varies with reward magnitude because of the increased
motivational or affective significance of greater rewards and pen-
alties. Thus, the mechanism by which the P300 is sensitive to
reward magnitude remains an issue for future research.
It has been reported previously that a larger P300 is observed
in response to affectively negative images than in response to
positive images that are matched according to subjective ratings
of arousal (Ito et al., 1998), suggesting that the P300 is sensitive to
the valence of stimuli. This result initially seems at odds with the
present finding that the valence of chosen outcomes does not
affect the P300 and seems easier to reconcile with our finding of
an increased positivity over right posterior scalp regions when
alternative outcomes were better than chosen outcomes (i.e., af-
ter feedback indicating that participants had made the incorrect
choice). One possible characterization of these findings is that
effects of valence on the P300 are observed when valence is de-
fined in terms of high-level affective evaluations, for example,
reflecting regret or disappointment (at having made an incorrect
choice) or disgust (in response to affectively negative images), but
not when valence is defined in terms of straightforward reward
value.
Thus, an important implication of our findings is that multi-
ple evaluative processes may contribute to P300 generation. An
issue for future research will be to tease apart these processes and
to distinguish the neural mechanisms underlying them. Neuro-
imaging studies have already identified a number of regions that
are sensitive to reward magnitude, including the orbitofrontal
cortex, insula, and ventral striatum (Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson
et al., 2000; Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2003). It is possible
that a number of these cortical sources contribute to the broadly
distributed effect of reward magnitude observed here, an issue
that might be addressed using high-density recording methods
and EEG decomposition analyses. These approaches should also
provide insight into the neural basis of the effects we observed
with alternative outcomes, which elicited an increased positivity
when they indicated incorrect response choices. Our data provide
tentative evidence of right lateralization of these effects, a finding
that might be pursued in future research.
The most likely neural generator of the feedback negativity,
given its frontocentral focus, is the anterior cingulate cortex
(Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd
and Coles, 2002), an area that is consistently activated in neuro-
imaging studies of reward processing (Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson
et al., 2000; Delgado et al., 2003). Consistent with the present
findings, this area has been shown to be more sensitive to negative
than positive outcomes (Knutson et al., 2000; Delgado et al.,
2003), and recent evidence suggests that it is relatively insensitive
to reward magnitude (Delgado et al., 2003). Thus, converging
evidence suggests that the anterior cingulate cortex forms part of
a system responsible for evaluating the reward value and motiva-
tional significance of ongoing events (Gehring and Willoughby,
2002; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). How-
ever, the present findings indicate that evaluative information
processed by the anterior cingulate cortex is somewhat limited,
being insensitive to the magnitude of experienced rewards, to the
value of rewards that were not directly experienced, and to the
relative value of chosen and alternative outcomes.
These findings suggest important constraints on theories of
anterior cingulate function and the feedback negativity. Most
obviously, theories that associate the feedback negativity with
“instant utility” (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) or changes in
expected value (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) would appear to pre-
dict that a greater negativity should be observed after larger mon-
etary losses. The present findings of a null effect of reward mag-
nitude on the feedback negativity contradict these predictions.
To explain our findings, one might propose that the evaluative
process is simply rather coarse in nature, providing a discrete
evaluation of events as good or bad regardless of magnitude.
Alternatively, the evaluative process might scale reward by the
expected magnitude of the outcomes (Holroyd et al., 2004). In
the present study, reward magnitude could be predicted to some
degree, because particular card colors were consistently associ-
ated with large or small outcomes. Either way, the present find-
ings make the important point that the feedback negativity does
not reflect a simple scalar evaluation of reward value.
The present findings of behavioral adjustments and their re-
lationship to neural activity also have implications for current
theories. We found that participants were more likely to choose
large, risky options immediately after experiencing losses, and
that a greater feedback negativity to losses was observed in par-
ticipants who showed a greater shift to risk-taking behavior after
such losses. That is, after a large loss of money, participants
tended to repeat the response choice that led to that outcome
(selection of the large, risky option), particularly if the outcome
elicited a large feedback negativity. This finding presents a chal-
lenge to the hypothesis that the feedback negativity reflects a
process of associative reinforcement learning (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002), which predicts that participants should be less likely
rather than more likely to repeat response choices that led to
negative outcomes and a feedback negativity. Instead, the result
provides evidence of higher-level strategic adjustments. It seems
that participants attempted to compensate for experienced losses
by taking short-term risks in the hope of large wins, thus falling
prey to the gambler’s fallacy. Our findings suggest that the feed-
back negativity provides an effective index of the neural process-
ing underlying these strategic adjustments in behavior.
Interestingly, evidence of associative learning effects were ap-
parent in participants’ responses to alternative outcomes. Partic-
ipants were more likely to gamble on large, risky outcomes if on
the previous trial they had missed out on a large win. That is, they
were more likely to select response options that were recently
associated with positive (alternative) outcomes. However, such
events were not accompanied by a feedback negativity, but were
instead associated with an increased positivity over posterior
scalp regions, perhaps somewhat lateralized to the right hemi-
sphere. An important goal for future research will be to extend
the present results, in which the amplitude of this scalp positivity
was only marginally reliably associated with behavioral adjust-
ments, and to develop theories of the relationship between the
various evaluative processes reflected in the ERP.
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